di Adrian.

Returned with therens. I read with great interest.

18th September 1992

N30/10.

Thank you for taking part in our Colloquium last week and helping to make it a success.

Many people have suggested that, while the discussions are fresh in our minds, we should collect some views on the basic points we debated. The result might even give us something useful to pass on to Sir Adrian Cadbury as he assesses the responses he has received.

With this in mind, I enclose a questionnaire. If you are able to spare the time to fill it in, it would be much appreciated. It is deliberately couched in somewhat simplistic terms - any more sophisticated responses would of course be welcome.

Any comments passed on to Sir Adrian (or others) would be given on a non-attributed basis.

Incidentally, if you would like any copies of the papers, please do not hesitate to let me know.

P.R.J. Holland

encs

Corporate Governance

Some questions arising out of the Oxford Law Colloquium 1992

Code of Best Practice In general, do you support the Cadbury recommendations? Yes No Should non-executive directors have, as part of their role, a "control" Yes or "monitoring" function vis-a-vis the executive directors? No Do you agree that, where the chairman is also the chief executive, there Yes should be independent directors on the board, one of whom is the No appointed leader? Do you think that all directors on a board should have the same legal Yes powers and responsibilities (ignoring duties and responsibilities as No executives), i.e. that the current legal position should remain unchanged? Do you believe that the proposals in 2 or 3 above, if implemented, Yes would eventually lead to a two tier board system in the UK? No 6. Do you see any merit in a two tier board system if introduced in the Yes UK? No 7. Do you think that the requirement for at least two independent non-Yes executives is too onerous for the smaller listed companies? No Do you share the concerns that the supply of potential non-executive Yes directors may be insufficient? No 9. Do you agree with the Cadbury recommendations for remuneration committees Yes No audit committees Yes No committees for the nomination of non-executives Yes No

10.	Should the chairmen of the audit and remuneration committees be required to answer questions at AGMs?	Yes No				
11.	Should all directors (including executives) have the right to seek independent professional advice at the company's expense, subject to notification to, say, the company secretary (or similar procedure), a cap on expenses, etc., but <i>not</i> subject to any prior consent?	Yes No	0			
Directors' Remuneration, etc.						
12.	Should remuneration committees be allowed to have an executive director (even the chief executive) as a member as well as non-executive directors or at least to have an executive director in attendance at all meetings?	Yes No				
13.	Is the present level of detail in companies' accounts concerning directors' remuneration and benefits satisfactory?	Yes No				
Directors and Others' Activities						
14.	Is the definition of "connected person" of a director (see A&O's Directors' Guides distributed in the Colloquium folder) unnecessarily complicated?	Yes No				
15.	If a director believes that some of his fellow directors (including his chairman) are materially breaching a third party's rights (but not committing criminal offences), should he be able to "whistle blow" to a particular authority, i.e. should he be protected against claims for breach of confidentiality etc.?	Yes No				
16.	Is an institutional shareholder with a significant shareholding in a listed company justified in selling out when dissatisfied with the management and/or its performance (rather than attempt to take action to persuade the company to improve itself)?	Yes No				
Insider Dealing						
17.	Do you support the proposals to tighten up insider dealing laws, even if this may endanger the "brokers' lunch" or inhibit discussions with substantial shareholders?	Yes No				
Takeovers						
18.	In your view, is the threat of a hostile bid a useful discipline for corporate management?	Yes No				

19.	Would it result in better governance if the current rules on takeovers were changed radically, e.g. to provide:					
	(i)	a bidder is allowed (in the absence of a subsequent competing bid) to make only one offer (i.e. no improvement of a bid during its course); and	Yes No			
	(ii)	an offer must be conditional on a majority vote of independent shareholders in the target given at a general meeting called to consider the offer; and	Yes No			
	(iii)	no share purchases may be made by the offeror or his associates during the offer period without target shareholders' prior consent.	Yes No			
Auc	litor	's				
20.		auditors realistically be able to make a sensible endorsement of a appany's statement of the extent of its compliance with the Cadbury de?	Yes No			
21.	Sho	uld audit partners within an accountancy firm rotate?	Yes No			
22.	Is th	ne decision in Caparo satisfactory?	Yes No			
23.	If not, would it be helpful if the auditors had duties of care to potential investors and creditors (as well as to existing shareholders) but, at the same time, their <i>standard</i> of care were reduced to below the current level of negligence?					
24.	red	you think that the UK accounting standards should be changed to use the extent of discretions permitted, i.e. to make the accounting ctices used by companies more consistent with each other?	Yes No			
You	ırsel	f				
25.	fori	uld you, in principle, like to attend another colloquium (in a similar nat and style) if Allen & Overy and the Oxford Law Faculty were organise one in two years' time?	Yes No			
26.		you have any suggestions for improvements in the Colloquium or er comments?	Yes No			
27.		ny of your comments are passed on to Sir Adrian Cadbury or ers, do you wish us to attribute them to you?	Yes No			

<u>Draft: 27.10.92</u>

E03844002

THE OXFORD LAW COLLOQUIUM 1992

9th - 11th September

COLLATED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONNAIRES

We received a total return of seventy-two questionnaires including two from GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL and one from LOEFF CLAEYS VERBEKE. Attached is a collation of the answers including comments from contributors.

1. In general, do you support the Cadbury recommendations?

YES

NO

N/A

65

4

LOEFF: N/A

GIDE (FW): YES GIDE (NCN): N/A

Mr. Norman Ireland Chairman BOWATER PLC "I support a number of the Cadbury recommendations but I could not say in principle I give it my support. It needs amendment".

Mr. Edwin Glasgow QC Chairman FINANCIAL REPORTING REVIEW PANEL "It is surprising to me that so few people had appreciated the fundamental weakness of the Cadbury recommendation in respect of non-executive directors: that those companies and chief executives who need to be kept in line will by definition be the most unwilling and reluctant to allow effective non-executives onto the board, Cadbury offers no practical solution to this.

UNATTRIBUTABLE

Yes: "Up to a point"

2. Should non-executive directors have, as part of their role, a "control" or "monitoring" function vis-a-vis the executive directors?

YES

N/A

59

7

3

LOEFF: YES GIDE (FW): YES GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"But the terminology is wrong"

Sir Charles Fraser LOTHIAN & EDINBURGH ENTERPRISE LTD.

"That seems to me a Natural and Normal function, but is there confusion in the words "executive directors".

Mr. David W. Watts Investment Director GARTMORE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LTD.

"Not so concerned if chairman is separated from chief executive".

Senior Technical Partner, COOPERS & LYBRAND

Mr. Matthew L. Patient "Already implicit, so why not make explicit".

Professor Len S. Sealy "Depends on the type and size of the company". GONVILLE & CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMRBIDGE

"Only to the extent that specific tasks imply this". Mr. Gordon K. Stevens Chairman SCHOLL PLC

Mr Martin Lipton "Monitoring only". Senior Partner, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & RETZ, NEW YORK

Mr. R. Cooper Chairman MALLETT PLC

"Yes: monitoring; No: Control".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"I am strongly against control by non-executives who have little experience of day to day running of the business of their "host company". I believe part of the function of non-executives is to monitor the performance of executives against defined financial targets, in particular annual budgets".

3. Do you agree that, where the chairman is also the chief executive, there should be independent directors on the board, one of whom is the appointed leader?

YES

NO

N/A

53

10

6

LOEFF: NO

GIDE (FW): YES GIDE (NCN): N/A

Mr. Brian L. Fuller Chief Executive THE HOPKINSONS GROUP PLC "The last part is impractical in my view".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"But "recognised" rather than "appointed".

Mr. G. Cardona Manager Group Head Office, HSBC HOLDINGS PLC "It depends!"

Mr. Gordon K. Stevens Chairman SCHOLL PLC "But prefer separate Ch + C.E.O."

Sir John Riddel Deputy Chairman CREDIT SUISSE FIRST

"Not in so formal a way".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

BOSTON LTD.

"Two questions a) There should be independent directors on the board - YES

b) One of whom is the appointed leader - NO

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"This is two parts; Yes, to independent directors; No, to \underline{a} leader".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

No: "Leader - of what?"

Mr. Blenyth Jenkins Director of Corporate Affairs INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS

"Yes, to independent directors on the board; No, to an appointed leader".

4. Do you think that all directors on a board should have the same legal powers and responsibilities (ignoring duties and responsibilities as executives), i.e. that the current legal position should remain unchanged?

YES NO

59 10

LOEFF: YES GIDE (FW): YES

GIDE (NCN): N/A

N/A

5. Do you believe that the proposals in 2 or 3 above, if implemented, would eventually lead to a two tier board system in the UK?

YES

NO

N/A

14

51

4

LOEFF: NO

GIDE (FW): N/A

GIDE (NCN): N/A

Sir Charles Fraser LOTHIAN & EDINBURGH ENTERPRISE LTD.

"I trust not!"

Sir Iain Noble Bt.OBE NOBLE & COMPANY LTD.

No: "not necessarily in the accepted sense but unofficially yes".

Mr. G. Cardona Manager Group Head Office HSBC HOLDINGS PLC N/A: "probably".

Sir John Riddell Deputy Chairman CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON LTD.

"But I have "two tier" prejudices".

Do you see any merit in a two tier board system if introduced in the ${\tt UK?}$ 6.

YES

NO

N/A

18

49

2

LOEFF: YES

GIDE (FW): YES

GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE N/A: "Impossibly wide question!"

7. Do you think that the requirement for at least two independent non-executives is too onerous for the smaller listed companies?

YES NO N/A 10 58 1

LOEFF: NO GIDE (FW): YES GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE No: "Provided criteria are widened; also very modest fees".

Mr. David W. Watts Investment Director GARTMORE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LTD. "Subject to supply".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"Not necessarily sometimes it may be".

8. Do you share the concerns that the supply of potential non-executive directors may be insufficient?

YES NO N/A 28 40 1

LOEFF: NO GIDE (FW): NO GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE

No: "Provided criteria are widened".

Mr. Norman Ireland Chairman BOWATER PLC "My own experience was such that with a little effort I was able to find truly suitable people for the Bowater board. What I feel is missing is that there is not enough communication between industrial concerns who might be wishing to put executive directors on other boards for experience. This does not mean that we need a register and a new organised body. It just means Chairman or Chief Executives have to move around and know outstanding needs".

9. Do you agree with the Cadbury recommendations for

- remuneration committees

YES

NO

N/A

68

1

LOEFF: YES

GIDE (FW): YES

GIDE (NCN): N/A

audit committees

YES

NO1.

N/A

63

4

2

LOEFF: YES

GIDE (FW): YES

GIDE (NCN): N/A

- Committees for the nomination of non-executives

YES

NO

N/A

53

12

4

LOEFF:

YES

GIDE (FW): YES

Mr. Norman Ireland

Chairman BOWATER PLC (Audit Committees)

"In the Cadbury sense I do not support them but I am, in Bowater, having all the directors meet with the auditor twice a year. I believe it is very important that executive directors are aware of the seriousness of the role of the auditor".

Mr. Gordon K. Stevens Chairman "To taste - needs acceptance by $\underline{\text{whole}}$ board".

SCHOLL PLC

Mr. Peter S. Barton Managing Director LEHMAN BROTHERS (Audit Committees)

"I agree there should be such a committee but believe the Finance Director should be a member". INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

UNATTRIBUTABLE

(Non-executive committees)

No: "Provided selection has participation from and approval of non execs".

10. Should the chairmen of the audit and remuneration committees be required to answer questions at AGMs?

YES NO N/A 50 18 1

LOEFF: YES GIDE (FW): NO GIDE (NCN): N/A

Mr. Matthew L. Patient "Providing it relates strictly to their role". Senior Technical Partner, COOPERS & LYBRAND

UNATTRIBUTABLE "No: audit; Yes: remuneration".

UNATTRIBUTABLE "Yes, but optional".

DIRECTORS

Mr. Blenyth Jenkins Yes: "If invited by the Chairman". Director of Corporate Affairs INSTITUTE OF

11. Should all directors (including executives) have the right to seek independent professional advice at the company's expense, subject to notification to, say the company secretary (or similar procedure), a cap on expenses, etc., but not subject to any prior consent?

YES NO N/A
54 14 1

LOEFF: N/A GIDE (FW): NO GIDE (NCN): N/A

Sir Charles Fraser LOTHIAN & EDINBURGH ENTERPRISE LTD. "I see nothing revolutionary in this. Non-execs have always been able to do so.

Mr. Norman Ireland Chairman BOWATER PLC "I believe all directors should have the right to seek independent professional advice at the company's expense but it should be, as a matter of courtesy if nothing else, subject to notification to his board colleagues".

Martin Lipton Senior Partner, WARDELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & RETZ, NEW YORK "Prior consent of the Board".

12. Should remuneration committees be allowed to have an executive director (even the chief executive) as a member as well as non-executive directors or at least to have an executive director in attendance at all meetings?

YES

NO

N/A

53

16

LOEFF: N/A GIDE (FW): YES GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"Only chairman or C/E "in attendance" when remuneration of executive colleagues is discussed. We've found it helpful to have a prior "scene setting" session with only the head of "Human Resources" present - before any specific criteria or actual increments are proposed".

Senior Technical Partner, COOPERS & LYBRAND

Mr. Matthew L. Patient "May attend but not be a member"

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"Chief Executive: He would generally be putting forth

their proposals".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

Yes: "At least have an executive director in

attendance at all meetings".

13. Is the present level of detail in companies' accounts concerning directors' remuneration and benefits satisfactory?

YES NO

41

LOEFF: N/A GIDE (FW): N/A GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE "I agree the need to split out results based remuneration".

Mr. Matthew L. Patient "Length and time of contracts insufficient eg. Senior Technical Ultramar".

Partner, COOPER &

Mr. Norman Ireland Chairman BOWATER PLC

LYBRAND

26

"The question is rather too sweeping. The information from some companies is satisfactory, from others it is not. However, at the same time I think we must keep in mind that directors contracts for more than one year have to be on show at the annual general meeting".

N/A

2

14. Is the definition of "connected person" of a director (see A&O's Directors' Guides distributed in the Colloquium folder) unnecessarily complicated?

YES NO N/A
44 16 9

LOEFF: N/A GIDE (FW): N/A GIDE (NCN): N/A

Mr. Andrew L. Wallis Group Finance Director AAH HOLDINGS PLC "It is very complicated, but needs to be comprehensive to prevent abuse; the suggestion that it is <u>over</u> complicated should be resisted".

15. If a director believes that some of his fellow directors (including his chairman) are materially breaching a third party's rights (but not committing criminal offences), should he be able to "whistle blow" to a particular authority, i.e. should he be protected against claims for breach of confidentiality etc.?

YES NO N/A
46 12 11

LOEFF: N/A GIDE (FW): N/A GIDE (NCN): N/A

Sir Charles Fraser LOTHIAN & EDINBURGH ENTERPRISE LTD.

"There are ways of dealing with this".

Mr. G. Cardona Manager Group Head Office HSBC HOLDINGS PLC

"Within certain institutional frameworks yes".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"Don't know, but the bottom line is morally yes".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"Two separate questions".

Mr. Andrew L. Wallis Group Finance Director AAH HOLDINGS PLC

"Attention is drawn to IMMACE under the aegis of the ICAEW. Perhaps the IOD could set up a similar service".

16. Is an institutional shareholder with a significant shareholding in a listed company justified in selling out when dissatisfied with the management and/or its performance (rather than attempt to take action to persuade the company to improve itself)?

YES NO N/A 57 8 4

LOEFF: YES GIDE (FW): YES GIDE (NCN): N/A

Mr. David W. Watts Investment Director GARTMORE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LTD. "He is answerable to his client on performance. I am not saying selling is necessarily the optimal solution".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

" - But it might prefer to take positive action".

Mr. Norman Ireland Chairman BOWATER PLC

"I hold the view that institutions are not shareholders, they are investors, and that they really are servants of their own company's shareholders and have to perform to the best of their ability. In correctly run companies they have every right to discuss matters with the company but I fear they don't do it often enough".

Mr. Gordon K. Stevens Chairman SCHOLL PLC

"But after reasonable warning".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"No simple answer - must depend on facts".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"They MUST do so to discharge duty to client".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"On occasions, yes".

Mr. Mark D. Knight Company Secretary THE THOMSON CORPORATION

"Totally".

17. Do you support the proposals to tighten up insider dealing laws, even if this may endanger the "brokers' lunch" or inhibit discussions with substantial shareholders?

YES NO N/A
22 44 3

LOEFF: NO GIDE (FW): YES GIDE (NCN): N/A

Mr. G. Cardona Manager Group Head Office HSBC HOLDINGS PLC "NO, NO, NO,! They already make communication difficult".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"Difficult - a reasonable information flow is important".

Professor Len S. Sealy GONVILLE & CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMRBIDGE "The present law should be left as is and the resources for making it work should be beefed up".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"Doubt if they will clarify a very grey area".

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"Problem of enforcement, not law. Present proposals unlikely to help".

Mr. Andrew L. Wallis Group Finance Director AAH HOLDINGS PLC "Analysts and/or substantial shareholders can opt to be made insiders or not. Insider dealing is particularly pernicious and anything that makes it easier to detect and eliminate is to be welcomed". 18. In your view, is the threat of a hostile bid a useful discipline for corporate management?

YES NO N/A 56 12 1

LOEFF: YES GIDE (FW): YES GIDE (NCN): N/A

Mr. David W. Watts Investment Director GARTMORE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LTD. "In the absence of good corporate governance i.e. 1-17 above".

UNATTRIBUTABLE "Sadly! But it should not be!"

UNATTRIBUTABLE "More useful for shareholders".

UNATTRIBUTABLE "Depends on the quality of the management".

UNATTRIBUTABLE "Bids may be contested, not necessarily hostile. It is the defence that are hostile".

19. Would it result in better governance if the current rules on takeovers were changed radically, e.g. to provide:

a bidder is allowed (in the absence of a subsequent competing (i) bid) to make only one offer (i.e. no improvement of a bid during its course); and

YES NO, N/A

29 36 4

No: "ridiculous proposal".

LOEFF: NO GIDE (FW): N/A GIDE (NCN): N/A

Mr. Andrew L. Wallis Group Finance Director AAH HOLDINGS PLC

UNATTRIBUTABLE

"Serious consideration should be given to the compulsory provision of a bond by the hostile bidder, payable to the target in the event the bid fails".

an offer must be conditional on a majority vote of independent shareholders in the target given at a general meeting called to consider the offer; and

YES NO N/A

7 17 45

LOEFF: GIDE (FW): N/A NO GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE No: "Why?".

> (iii) no share purchases may be made by the offeror or his associates during the offer period without target shareholders' prior consent.

YES NO N/A

25 40

LOEFF: YES GIDE (FW): N/A

GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE "Simply gives power to arbitrageurs". UNATTRIBUTABLE

"What about approvals from the bidders shareholders, for better governance?

20. Will auditors realistically be able to make a sensible endorsement of a company's statement of the extent of its compliance with the Cadbury Code?

YES NO N/A

29 39 1

LOEFF: N/A GIDE (FW): NO GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE "Not without a lot more investigation and expense".

UNATTRIBUTABLE No: "Impossible - other than in simplistic and mechanistic terms!"

21. Should audit partners within an accountancy firm rotate?

YES NO N/A

43 22 4

LOEFF: YES GIDE (FW).: NO GIDE (NCN): N/A

UNATTRIBUTABLE "Only if merit is seen in a change".

Mr. Gordon K. Stevens "Not by mandate". Chairman SCHOLL PLC 22. Is the decision in Caparo satisfactory?

YES NO N/A 18 43 8

LOEFF: N/A GIDE (FW): N/A GIDE (NCN): N/A

Sir Charles Fraser LOTHIAN & EDINBURGH ENTERPRISE LTD. "Difficult issue - further debate necessary".

23. If not, would it be helpful if the auditors had duties of care to potential investors and creditors (as well as to existing shareholders) but, at the same time, their standard of care were reduced to below the current level of negligence?

YES NO N/A 29 17 23

LOEFF: N/A GIDE (FW): NO

GIDE (NCN): N/A

24. Do you think that the UK accounting standards should be changed to reduce the extent of discretions permitted, i.e. to make the accounting practices used by companies more consistent with each other?

YES NO N/A 61 5 3

LOEFF: YES GIDE (FW): N/A GIDE (NCN): N/A

Mr. Norman Ireland Chairman BOWATER PLC ". . . . it should be up to the auditor on the concept of true and fair to say to the company "Your presentation is incorrect".