Covers two-tier boards, audit committees, independence of non-executive directors.
Covers non-executive directors and external auditing.
The paper briefly reviews issues in corporate governance: appointment of non-executive directors to the board and their contribution; the integrity of financial information; auditing standards and the responsibilities of auditors.
Letters expressing interest in Committee and comment on independent non-executive directors.
Letter, 9 May 1991, from Martin Simons about timely payment of bills. Accompanying photocopy of letter, published in The Times.
Neville Bain sets out some points on directors and responsibilities, annual reports and audit committees.
Objective of the meeting: to canvass Sir Ron's view of the ground the Committee might cover.
Letter in response to Sir Adrian Cadbury's letter of 2 July. IHD will send transcript of talk to ICAS on non-executive directors.
Includes the CBI response to the ABI discussion paper on the responsibilities of institutional shareholders and minutes of meeting held on 25 June 1991.
Bow Group paper contains recommendations on non-executive directors, remuneration committees, audit committees, separation of roles, training for directors and their contracts, reporting auditing and memo from Sir Adrian Cadbury.
Expresses concern about tone and prescriptiveness of the report with regard to non-executive directors.
Includes correspondence from an institutional investor and articles of association of Guinness.
Sets out what ASB would be happy for the Cadbury Committee to consider.
Refers to the Blue Arrow affair and role of non-executive directors.
The letter is a response to a request to give evidence. Areas for discussion: responsibilities of shareholders, independence of auditors, influence of analysts, information to be given in reports.The letter has a siginifcant number of handwritten comments in Sir Adrian's hand.
A contribution to the key issues for the Committee: roles of non-executive directors and shareholders; internal control systems; auditing appointments.
Comments on non-executive directors.
Letter accompanies draft guidelines and survey of remuneration committees will follow in hard copy.
Fax contains comments on a proposed structure for the final output and short comments on papers for the next meeting
Concentrates on the role of non-executive directors.
Sir Adrian sought advice from ICI, Sir Denys Henderson, and Sir David Plastow, Vickers, about non-executive directors' access to professional services and reimbursement for costs. Also a note by Nigel Peace.
Letter gives personal views of MG Lickiss on independence of non-executive directors and their responsibilities for discussing the process of the audit with external auditors, separation of the role of Chief Executive and Chairman, internal system controls applying to quoted companies.
Includes handwritten notes by Sir Adrian Cadbury and a summary of CRAs' corporate governance colloquium, 4 Dec 1991.
24. Record of meeting with Mr Dennis Stevenson, chairman of SRU Group and non-executive director of Manpower plc (formerly Blue Arrow), on 9 September 1991. And letter written by Stevenson to Institutional Shareholders' Committee.
Comments on remuneration, directors' responsibilities and non-executive directors access to independent advice. Includes extract from a biographical sources and Sir Adrian's handwritten notes.
Gives the Labour position at the time.
Record focuses on role of accounting standards and auditors.
Letter expresses concerns about contracts granted to directors.
Letter concentrates on various committees within a company and a responsible attitude being adopted by institutional shareholders.
Submisson concentrates on communication between companies and their shareholders, reporting on intangible assets and non-executive directors.
Letter comments on the number of non-executive directorships held.
Letter sets out personal views on the role of non-executive directors.
The submission covers the composition of the Board e.g. Separate Chairman and Chief Executive, non-executive directors; qualitative and quantitative financial reports, importance of non-executive directors, external auditors and audit committees.
Letter gives his view on roles and responsibilites of non-executive directors including remuneration committees.
Main content is 'A submission to the Committee on the Finacinal Aspects of Corporate Governance by the Institute of Public Relations , City & Financial Group, December 1991.
Covers issues such as communication between boards and shareholders, emphasis on the long term, corporate reporting, company-auditor relationships, responsibilities of non-executive directors, audit committees and auditors responsibilities.
Includes a draft work programme and an update of the draft Accounting Practices Board discussion draft.
Correspondence on subjects such as rights of executive directors to seek external professional advice and be re-imbursed, comments on comments on the draft report, the interests of of the 'private' shareholder as well as the interests of the institutional ones.
Comments on the papers circulated for the 20-21 January 1992 meeting.
Covers some aspects of institutional investors and also their relations with non-executive directors in two articles.
Submission covers communication between boards and stakeholders, executive and non-executive directors, corporate reporting.
The views cover the range of auditing issues, non-executive directors, responsibilities of directors, divided boards and other matters.
42. Report on a pilot study on attitudes toward the issues of corporate governance, a presentation by Angus Maitland, Burson-Marsteller at CBI/B-M conference on Corporate Governance 10 June 1992 and reply by Nigel Peace.
Reports the results of a survey. Auditors are least likely to benefit while non-executive directors benefit most. Responsibility for compliance lies with company management and institutional shareholders or Stock Exchange, while expresses doubts over self-regulation.
Comments on the wording re independence of non-executive directors.
Comments that fraud is very difficult to prevent and comments on non-executive directors and auditing, especially their resignation advice.
Comments on institutional investors, non-executive directors and internal auditors.
Comments on voluntary nature of the code, non-executive directors, the role of audit committees, directors' contracts and the independence of auditors.
Seeks and gives clarification on the meaning of independent in relation to non-executive directors.
This is a workshop exercise on the role of the directors in Eurotunnel delivered at the ICAEW conference . It is used to comment on unitary boards, separation of roles of Chairman and Chief Executive, non-executive directors and institutional investors.
Comments on non-executive directors, financial reporting, auditing and institutional shareholders.
Hirst expresses concern about the suggestion that non-executive directors should only serve on one board.